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Amid the swarm of debate about emotional intelligence (EI) among academics are claims
that cognitive intelligence, or general mental ability (g), is a stronger predictor of life and
work outcomes as well as the counter claims that EI is their strongest predictor. Nested
within the tempest in a teapot are scientiﬁc questions as to what the relationship is
between g and EI. Using a behavioral approach to EI, we examined the relationship of
a parametric measure of g as the person’s GMAT scores and collected observations from
others who live and work with the person as to the frequency of his or her EI behavior,
as well as the person’s self-assessment. The results show that EI, as seen by others, is
slightly related to g, especially for males with assessment from professional relations.
Further, we found that cognitive competencies are more strongly related to GMAT than
EI competencies. For observations from personal relationships or self-assessment, there
is no relationship between EI and GMAT. Observations from professional relations reveal
a positive relationship between cognitive competencies and GMAT and EI and GMAT for
males, but a negative relationship between EI and GMAT for females.
Keywords: emotional intelligence, cognitive ability, emotional intelligence competency, social intelligence
competency, cognitive competency
INTRODUCTION
General cognitive ability (g) has been consistently shown to pre-
dict job performance in many studies and meta-analyses over
the decades (Nisbett et al., 2012). But in the last 10–15 years,
emotional intelligence (EI) has also been shown to predict job per-
formance in an increasing number of studies (Fernández-Berrocal
and Extremera, 2006; Joseph and Newman, 2010; O’Boyle et al.,
2011; Joseph et al., 2014). A debate has emerged as towhether these
two individual characteristics are the same, different, or compli-
mentary. A meta-analysis of published papers as of 2009 claimed
that g showed more predictive ability of job performance than EI
(Joseph and Newman, 2010), although both were signiﬁcant. In
some recent studies EI has been shown to have greater predictive
ability than g (Côté and Miners, 2006; Boyatzis et al., 2012). This
study is an attempt to examine the relationship between a behav-
ioral approach to EI and g and help create a more comprehensive
perspective on these characteristics and the implications for future
research.
A major criticism of the EI concept was found in Matthews
et al. (2002), but they confused theoretical distinctions and mea-
surement issues. More recently,Webb et al. (2013) said, “Although
there is general agreement that the ultimate relevance of EI
lies in its ability to predict important life outcomes (e.g., qual-
ity of interpersonal relationships, academic or occupational
success), debate persists in how best to operationalize. . .and
measure EI. . .” (p. 154). The debate is confusing at times
because EI itself has been conceptualized and measured in various
ways.
In some approaches, EI is viewed as the ability to be aware
of and manage one’s emotions and those of others which have
been called stream 1 and stream 2 measures (Ashkanasy and Daus,
2005; O’Boyle et al., 2011). For example, Mayer et al. (1999) see
their concept of ability EI as a formal type of intelligence special-
ized in the ﬁeld of emotions and thus related to g. Initially, while
they had no intention to relate EI to job and life outcomes, later
studies have shown ability EI to associate with performance but
not as strongly as other approaches (O’Boyle et al., 2011; Miao
et al., unpublished). Another perspective sees EI as a set of self-
perceptions, which are different from but related to personality
traits (Bar-On, 1997) more than g. Although this approach along
with some measures known as Trait EI (Petrides and Furnham,
2001) have been shown to predict job performance (O’Boyle et al.,
2011), they also show a consistently strong relationship to person-
ality traits (Webb et al., 2013). Regardless, it has been ﬁled under
the uninformative label of “mixed models” (Mayer et al., 1999).
Another way to understand EI involves observing behavioral
manifestations of EI, in terms of how a person acts, as seen
by others (Boyatzis, 2009; Cherniss, 2010; Cherniss and Boy-
atzis, 2013). Known as behavioral EI, it offers a closer link to
job and life outcomes. Notably, it has been shown to predict job
performance above and beyond g and personality (Boyatzis and
Goleman, 2007). Nonetheless, this approach has been clustered
incorrectly with self-perception approaches and ﬁled under the
same label of mixed models (Mayer et al., 1999), also called stream
3 (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005; O’Boyle et al., 2011).
Although many issues emerging from these varied studies and
meta-analyses call for further research, in this paper, we focus
on examining the relationship between behavioral EI and g, and
assessing the potential moderator effects of gender and type of
observer or rater.
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BEHAVIORAL EI
Because all of the papers in this special issue of Frontiers in Psy-
chology are devoted to EI and g, we will forego an in-depth review
of the literature on EI, and instead focus directly on behavioral
EI. As mentioned above, EI competencies can be viewed as the
behavioral level of EI (Boyatzis, 2009; Cherniss, 2010; Cherniss
and Boyatzis, 2013). Competencies have been derived inductively
from studies of human performance in many occupations and
in many countries (Boyatzis, 2009). Because the identiﬁcation
of a competency and its reﬁnement emerges from performance
based criterion sampling, they are expected to be closely related
to job and life outcomes. As a result, the EI competencies were
discovered and measured as behaviors which were later clus-
tered around intent and became each competency (Boyatzis,
2009).
In Boyatzis andGoleman (2007), EI includes two factors, EI and
social intelligence (SI) competencies. EI includes competencies
called emotional self-awareness, emotional self control, adaptabil-
ity, achievement orientation, and positive outlook. In their model,
SI includes: empathy, organizational awareness, inﬂuence, inspi-
rational leadership, conﬂict management, coach and mentor, and
teamwork. For this paper, we are treating EI and SI competen-
cies as a single construct of EI. When universities wish to use this
EI model for student development and/or outcome assessment,
two cognitive competencies which have a history of predicting
effective leadership, management and professional performance
are added. They are: systems thinking and pattern recognition
(Boyatzis, 2009).
Behavioral EI as seen and measured through others’ assessment
(as compared to self-assessment) shows a consistent prediction
or relationship to job and life outcomes (Boyatzis, 1982, 2006;
McClelland, 1998; Nel, 2001; Cavallo and Brienza, 2002; Dulewicz
et al., 2003; Law et al., 2004; Sy et al., 2006; Dreyfus, 2008; Hop-
kins and Bilimoria, 2008; Koman and Wolff, 2008; Williams,
2008; Boyatzis and Ratti, 2009; Ramo et al., 2009; Ryan et al.,
2009, 2012; Young and Dulewicz, 2009; Boyatzis et al., 2011, 2012;
Aliaga Araujo and Taylor, 2012; Gutierrez et al., 2012; Sharma,
2012; Amdurer et al., 2013; Victoroff and Boyatzis, 2013; Mahon
et al., 2014; Badri, unpublished). Boyatzis et al. (2012) showed
behavioral EI predicted job performance with signiﬁcant unique
variance, controlling for g and personality.
According to the dominant classiﬁcation in Ashkanasy and
Daus (2005), there are three different streams of EI research.
Salovey and Mayer’s Ability EI as measured by the MSCEIT is
stream 1. Although it has shown relationships with school (Brack-
ett et al., 2004), job and life outcomes (Mayer et al., 2008), these
were not of primary consideration in its development (Mayer
et al., 1999). Whereas ability EI shows no relationship to person-
ality measures, it has shown consistent prediction of g, even when
controlling for personality (Webb et al., 2013).
Self-perceptions and peer-report measures based on the Abil-
ity EI model are clustered within stream 2 (Ashkanasy and
Daus, 2005). These measures such as the Trait EI Questionnaire
(TEIQue; Petrides and Furnham, 2000, 2001), show similar valid-
ity patterns to the MSCEIT but are not as strongly related to g, nor
job and life outcomes, yet they do show a signiﬁcant relationship
to personality (Webb et al., 2013).
Meanwhile, stream 3 (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005) clusters both
those EI measures based on self-perception and others’ behav-
ioral assessments (i.e., 360◦, coded behavior from audiotape or
videotape work samples or simulations). Consequently, there is a
partition in results within this stream: some measures such as the
ESCI (Boyatzis andGoleman,2007) showa strong relationship and
unique variance to life and job outcomes beyond g and personality
(Byrne et al., 2007; Downey et al., 2011), while others such as the
EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997) show a consistent relationship in predicting
personality (Joseph and Newman, 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2011). We
therefore, claim that clustering self-perception and coded or other
perception measures confuses these relationships.
Instead, we support Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera’s
(2006, p. 8) comprehensive view of the EI ﬁeld by which
all “approaches try to discover the emotional components that
underlie emotionally intelligent people and the mechanisms and
processes that set off the use of these abilities in our everyday
life” (emphasis added). In the authors’ review of the ﬁrst 15 years
of EI research, behavioral EI as seen by others in 360◦ assess-
ments is considered separately from self-perception approaches
focused on moods and internal states, as well as personality traits
such as Bar-On’s (1997, 2007; Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera,
2006). Therefore, Boyatzis (2009) extends the work of Fernández-
Berrocal and Extremera (2006) to propose an organization of
the literature that is framed by the three existing methodologi-
cal themes: EI ability methods; EI self-perception methods; and EI
behavior methods.
In sum, the relationships of EI assessed at any level or with
any method are still debated with comparative arguments about
its link to g and personality. In this paper, we will focus on the
relationship between behavioral EI and a measure of g.
GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITY (g) AND INTELLIGENCE
According to Carroll’s (1993) model of intelligence, the various
mental abilities are structured hierarchically. General cognitive
ability, located at its apex, is “the general efﬁcacy of intellec-
tual processes” (Ackerman et al., 2005, p. 32). Also known as
general mental ability, general intelligence, or simply g, it is a well-
researched construct with a large body of evidence supporting
its predictive validity for such important outcomes as job perfor-
mance and career success (e.g., O’Reilly III and Chatman, 1994;
Schmidt and Hunter, 1998; Ferris et al., 2001). As a global abil-
ity, g can be thought of as the underlying common factor to all
types of cognitive processing (i.e., verbal, mathematical, spatial,
logical, musical, and emotional). From this perspective, g cannot
be observed nor measured directly, it must be inferred from the
positive correlations among distinct ability measures (Spearman,
1904; Jensen, 1998). As such, g subsumes different sets of abilities,
each corresponding to a specialization of general intelligence.
General cognitive ability can be assessed through a variety of
measures, such as IQ tests (Jensen, 1992; i.e., Ravens Progressive
Matrices, Wechsler, Stanford Binet; Nisbett et al., 2012). Similarly,
standardized admissions tests have been shown to “ﬁt the general
requisites of a measure of general cognitive ability” (O’Reilly III
and Chatman, 1994). They also measure verbal and mathematical
or quantitative reasoning skills separately. These tests such as the
SAT,GRE,GMAT,MCAT,LSAT, andDAT are usually found to have
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strong correlationswith themore directmeasures of g, (Detterman
and Daniel, 1989).
The GMAT is a standardized test that assesses a person’s analyt-
ical, writing, quantitative, verbal and reading skills for admission
into graduate management programs worldwide. Although the
GMAT is not formally validated as a measure of general cognitive
ability, it is strongly correlated with the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT; e.g., Gottesman and Morey, 2006), which is shown to be a
valid measure of g (Frey and Detterman, 2004). Considering the
structural similarity of these tests (both consist of multiple choice
questions that measure verbal and quantitative skills) and the gen-
eral consensus that the g-factor can be measured by obtaining
factorial scores across tests of different speciﬁc aptitudes, usually
verbal and quantitative (O’Reilly III and Chatman, 1994), Hed-
lund et al. (2006, p. 102) concluded that “like the SAT, the GMAT
can be characterized as a traditional measure of intelligence, or
a test of general cognitive ability (g).” Indeed numerous studies
have already used the GMAT as a measure of g (e.g., O’Reilly III
and Chatman, 1994; Kumari and Corr, 1996; Mueller and Curhan,
2006), the latest of which is a study published in Intelligence (Piffer
et al., 2014).
We suggest that the EI competencies may show a small, if any
relationship to g. In fact, correlations between behavioral EI com-
petencies coded from audiotapes of critical incident interviews
about work samples and GMAT were not signiﬁcant (r = −0.015,
n = 200, p = ns; Boyatzis et al., 2002). In assessing predictors
of sales leadership effectiveness in the ﬁnancial services industry,
Boyatzis et al. (2012) reported that EI as assessed by others showed
a non-signiﬁcant correlation with Ravens Progressive Matrices
(r = 0.04, n = 60, p = ns).
In the inductive competency studies, two cognitive compe-
tencies repeatedly appeared to differentiate effective performance
of managers, executives and professionals (Boyatzis, 1982, 2009;
Spencer and Spencer, 1993). They were systems thinking and pat-
tern recognition. The former is deﬁned as seeing phenomenon
as a series of causal relationships affecting each other. The latter
is deﬁned as perceiving themes or patterns in seemingly random
information. As competencies, they are assessed both with a self-
assessment and with observations of others as to how often a
person demonstrates these behaviors. They are not deﬁned or
assessed as an intelligence measure but an indication of how often
a person appears to be using these thought processes. As such, we
expect them to be related to g more than EI competencies even
though they are not a measure of g.
This leads us to the ﬁrst two hypotheses for this study:
Hypothesis 1: EI competencies will have a slight relationship to g.
Hypothesis 2: Cognitive competencies will be more related to g than EI
competencies.
SELF AND MULTI-RATER ASSESSMENTS
Differences in raters or sources of assessment are likely to play
an important role in the ﬁndings. Self-perception and multi-rater
assessment are different approaches to perceiving and collecting
observations of a person’s behavior (Luthans et al., 1988; Church,
1997; Furnham and Stringﬁeld, 1998; Antonioni and Park, 2001;
Taylor and Hood, 2010).
Self-assessment measures generally address how individuals
respond to questions pertaining to their own emotions, per-
ceptions or thoughts. These measures are easier and faster to
administer than others, allowing for low costs of administration
(Saris and Gallhofer, 2007). Social desirability is often an issue in
self-reported measures (Paulhus and Reid, 1991). That is, respon-
dents may base their answers on a desired state that often leads to
inﬂated views of themselves. The validity of these measures can
be improved by including questions that help control for social
desirability (e.g., Paulhus and Reid, 1991; Steenkamp et al., 2010).
Used as a stand-alone measure, self-assessment of person-
ality traits, attitudes or behavioral tendencies show acceptable
validity (e.g., Furnham et al., 1999; Petrides and Furnham, 2000;
Furnham, 2001; Petrides et al., 2006; Bar-On, 2007). Similarly,
self-assessed measures of EI show acceptable validity (Bar-On,
1997; Petrides and Furnham, 2000, 2001). However, with regard
to EI, self-assessments are also used in combination with others’
ratings. Notably, the difference between self and others’ per-
ceptions is known as the self-other-agreement. This difference
is a highly reliable measure of self-awareness (Yammarino and
Atwater, 1997).
Multi-rater or multi-source assessments involve different raters
from work such as a person’s peers, collaborators, subordinates
or bosses, and possibly raters from one’s personal environment.
Raters provide observations of a person’s behavior (i.e., what they
have seen the person do). Research on social cognition reveals that
people give more weight to their own thoughts and feelings than
to their behavior when forming self-perceptions, but this effect
is reversed when forming perceptions of others (Vazire, 2010).
Different types of raters may offer unique information about the
person being assessed (Borman, 1997). People may behave differ-
ently depending on the situation (e.g., at home vs. work; Lawler,
1967).
Other behavioral assessments such as coding from audio or
videotapes of critical incidents or simulations may be considered
“pure” behavioral measures, but even these measures require peo-
ple to code them. In the coding, observers are engaged in subjective
perceptions and labeling. In such qualitative research, the scholars
increase conﬁdence in the data reported by assessing inter-rater
reliability. In 360◦ assessments, greater conﬁdence in the data is
developed from a consensual perception of multiple raters. In EI
studies, both types of measures attempt to assess how a person
has been acting as seen by others (i.e., a behavioral approach to
measurement of EI).
A number of studies show that there are differences among
boss’s, peers’ and subordinates’ views, and sometimes even others
like consultants, customers or clients. Atkins and Wood (2002)
claimed speciﬁc types of raters were best positioned to observe
and evaluate certain types of competencies depending on the per-
sonal and working relationships they had with the person being
evaluated. For example, subordinates were found to be the best
evaluators of competencies such as coaching and developing peo-
ple, when compared to bosses or peers (Luthans et al., 1988).
Similarly Gralewski and Karwowski (2013) showed how, even
though teachers are often accurate at assessing the intelligence and
academic achievement of their students (Südkamp et al., 2012),
they lack the ability to assess less conventional skill areas, such as
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students’ creativity. Different sources of raters might interpret the
same observed behavior in different ways (Tsui and Ohlott, 1988).
At the same time each rater source may have idiosyncratic tenden-
cies leading to different observations and measurement error, like
errors of leniency, central tendency, and range restriction (Saal
et al., 1980). These are likely to be moderated by cultural assump-
tions (Ng et al., 2012). The research in assessing performance as
well as skills and behavior with 360◦ assessments is summarized
in Bracken et al. (2001). Social identity theory would contend that
people ﬁnd more legitimacy in assessing themselves with regard
to those of higher status rather than merely more power (Taylor
and Hood, 2010), suggesting that raters from work will be more
potent than those from home.
Outside of family business, consulting or family therapy,
the sources or raters that have been studied do not include
family or friends (Bracken et al., 2001), with the exception of
Rivera-Cruz (2004). She reported that female managers showed
more EI competencies (as seen by others) at home versus
work. In a desire to be comprehensive in assessments, data was
collected in this study from a wide range of a person’s rela-
tions – those from work and from their personal life (Boyatzis,
2009).
With regard to intelligence, it is expected that professional
sources (i.e., sources from work) will have more of an oppor-
tunity to see and label behavior related to cognitive ability rather
than those at home or in one’s personal life.
This leads us to the third hypothesis for this study:
Hypothesis 3: Among personal, professional and self-assessment of a per-
son’s competencies, professional sourceswill show the strongest relationship
of EI and cognitive competencies to g.
GENDER DIFFERENCES
In self-assessment, an extensive body of literature validated by a
recent meta-analysis showed strong evidence of male hubris and
female humility: the tendency of males to have inﬂated views of
their abilities, opposite to females’ propensity to under-estimate
their worth (Furnham, 2001; Szymanowicz and Furnham, 2011).
At the same time, there may be a gender bias in the type of g mea-
sures themselves as Furnham (2001) proposes that results may be
based on the fact thatmost of thesemeasures are“male normative”.
That is, they include speciﬁc tasks, such as spatial processing or
mathematical reasoning at which males have been shown to do
better than females.
As to others’ ratings of EI competencies, stereotyping will likely
affect peers perceptions of males versus females, even in the same
setting (Taylor and Hood, 2010). Social identity theory, along
with social comparison theory and self-categorization theory are
expected to result in attributions made to females differently than
those made to males even if their behavior was the same (Sturm
et al., 2014). For example, Taylor and Hood (2010) reports that
even though female MBAs appear to be more assertive and self-
conﬁdent than other female samples, sexist bias in perception
results in males being seen as more assertive and conﬁdent than
females. However they did ﬁnd that predicted ratings of others
showed a gender difference: “women leaders believed that oth-
ers would rate them lower than the actual ratings they received”
(p. 542).
In light of these ﬁndings, we propose females may be subject
to sexist discrimination in their multi-source assessments, partic-
ularly those from raters at work. This suggests there may be an
interaction of both gender and rater in the relationship between
EI and g.
This leads us to the fourth hypothesis for this study:
Hypothesis 4: Gender moderates the relationship of EI and cognitive
competencies to g.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data were collected on 641 part-time and full-time MBA students
from 23 countries, in a leading European business school, between
2006 and 2013. 30% were females, with an average age of 33 years
for females and 34 years for males. As part of the MBA, the stu-
dents took a required course called Leadership Assessment and
Development which is based on the Intentional Change Theory
(Boyatzis, 2008). In the course, students were asked to complete
a self and multi-rater assessment of EI competencies. All data
were collected under the informed consent an ethical guidelines
of ESADE Business School.
MEASURES
Emotional Intelligence Competencies
We used the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory –
University Edition (ESCI-U; Boyatzis and Goleman, 2007), a
70-item survey instrument which measures 14 competencies of
two types: cognitive and emotional. The ﬁrst type is composed
of two cognitive competencies: systems thinking and pattern
recognition. The other, includes 12 EI competencies: emotional
self-awareness, emotional self control, adaptability, achievement
orientation, positive outlook, empathy, organizational awareness,
inﬂuence, inspirational leadership, conﬂict management, coach
and mentor, and teamwork. Because the behavioral manifesta-
tions of these competencies are frequently observed in a variety
of different situations they have been operationalized with as
many as ﬁve indicators per competency. Psychometric proper-
ties of the test based on samples of 62,000 completions of the
ESCI and 21,000 of the ESCI-U both reveals each scale shows
model ﬁt and satisﬁes criteria for discriminant and convergent
validity (Boyatzis et al., 2014). A wide variety of validation stud-
ies on the test were reviewed earlier in this paper and in Wolff
(2008).
Competencies can be considered to be the behavioral approach
to emotional, social, and cognitive intelligence (Boyatzis, 2009).
As such, the student is asked to solicit others from their work and
life to complete the test about their behavior. The students had an
average of 4.2 others complete the test for each of the 641 subjects
in this analysis (standard deviation equals to 1.6). It is believed that
multi-source assessment, such as 360◦, provides protection against
social desirability because of the distinct sources of responses.
Researchers have traditionally placed more emphasis on test-
ing hypotheses on the relationships among constructs than on
bridging the gap between abstract theoretical constructs and their
measurements (i.e., epistemic relationships; Bagozzi, 1984). In
our case, measurement error is particularly dangerous because
it affects ESCI as a GMAT predictor leading to biased estimates
of the structural effects (Frost and Thompson, 2000). Therefore,
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before estimating these effects, we examined the ESCI construct
validity1.
Since we suspected that the ESCI factorial structure provided
by the personal and the professional raters could be different as
a function of their different perspectives2 of the MBA students’
behavior, we have modeled the data separately. Two conﬁrma-
tory factor analysis (CFA) models have shown that both sets of
raters were consistent with the hypothesized 13-factor (i.e., the
competencies) model3.
For purposes of exploring our research question, we distin-
guished three types of sources, or assessments in this study. We
used a classiﬁcation provided by each respondent at the time of
completing the test. The responses were grouped as either: self,
personal, or professional. One is the assessment provided by the
student about himself or herself. Another source was personal,
such as a spouse/partner, friends, or family members. Professional
sources were bosses, peers, subordinates or clients from work or
classmates in the MBA program. There were a few cases in which
personal or professional assessmentsweremissing, these caseswere
dropped resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 624 individuals with per-
sonal and 611 with professional assessments available. All had
self-assessment.
MBA participants and their raters were asked to indicate the
frequency of the behavior on each item on an eleven point-scale
ranging from (0)‘the behavior is never shown’ to (10) ‘the behavior
is consistently shown.’ This response set provides higher quality
data on this predominantly European MBA population than the
usual 5-point scale (Batista-Foguet et al., 2009). The ﬁnal ESCI-U
scores have been mean-centered to ease the interpretation of the
parameters in the model. To compute the 360◦ assessments on the
70 items that constitute the ESCI-U survey, we ﬁrst obtained for
each item, its average score across all professional and personal
raters separately, and then averaged across the ﬁve items per each
competency. This way, our database consisted of 26,264 compe-
tency scores from 3 types of raters, on the 12 + 1 emotional, social,
and cognitive competencies.
General cognitive ability (g)
We used the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) as a
measure of g. For this study we chose to collect our GMAT data
from the GMAC, the entity that owns and administers the GMAT,
and not through the Admissions Ofﬁce at the University. We col-
lected the students’ GMAT scores from the ﬁrst time they took
the test. Using GMAT ﬁrst time scores as compared to the scores
with which students were admitted in the MBA program (usually
1We deﬁne validity as “the degree to which evidence and theory support the inter-
pretation of test scores entailed by proposed uses of tests” (American Educational
Research Association et al., 1999, p. 9).
2Since we didn’t assume that Personal and Professional raters have the same percep-
tion and aggregate them under the usual “other” category of raters, we have tested
their measurement or factorial equivalence (Meredith, 1993).
3Exploratory FactorAnalysis (EFA,Promax rotation) has already shown that systems
thinking and pattern recognition competencies correlate on both raters’ perceptions
above 0.94. The subsequent conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) didn’t reject the
unidimensionality of the 5 + 5 items corresponding to the two competencies, that
had ex-ante been assumed as distinct competencies. As a result, in this analysis, we
used thirteen instead of the usual 14 factors underlying the ESCI model on this MBA
population by having combined the two cognitive competencies into one scale.
obtained after repeatedly taking the test), enabled a wider range
of variation in GMAT with higher dispersion and lower means.
We, thus, attempted to minimize the issue of range restriction in
GMAT (Oh et al., 2008) and the resulting attenuation bias in the
model coefﬁcients. In our sample, the GMAT mean is 602.4, which
is a little higher than the overall GMAT for all test takers of 545.
The sample’s standard deviation of the GMAT is 79.3, almost two
thirds of the reported GMAT deviation (at 121). Therefore, our
sample contains individuals with slightly higher GMAT and less
“heterogeneous” scores than the population of GMAT applicants.
The ESCI-U data are conﬁgured in two non-nested structures:
(1) the rater groups, varying between self, personal or professional
raters; and (2) the competencies category with 13 competencies
divided into two types of competencies: cognitive and EI. The
hierarchal structure of the data model is shown in Figure 1.
The relationship between the ESCI-U and the GMAT scores
might be affected by whether the ESCI-U scores on each compe-
tency are independent or not from the rater group. Therefore,
treating each competency and group of raters as independent
might mask important information. To adjust for this possibil-
ity, we allowed for a possible dependent relationship between the
rater source and the competency category to be freely estimated in
our model.
In order to be able to accommodate such a complex data struc-
ture and the relationships among the competencies (13 in two
groups) and three types of raters, we need a speciﬁed model with
sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to assign the proper systematic and stochas-
tic variations. A multilevel/hierarchical model with non-nested
structures in the ﬁrst level (raters and competencies) and a nested
structure in one of the components (competencies in two groups)
is needed.
BAYESIAN MODEL SPECIFICATION
We chose to analyze the data and test our hypotheses by spec-
ifying a Bayesian hierarchical model. The choice to work with
a Bayesian model was due to two main factors: (1) the sample
FIGURE 1 | Emotional and Social Competencies Inventory – University
Edition (ESCI-U) data configuration.The ESCI-U data is framed within
two non-nested structures: (1) the raters group, composed of self, personal
and professional raters; and (2) the competencies category, withholding 14
competencies, which in turn are sub grouped into two types of
competencies: Emotional and Cognitive.
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was an entire population in and by itself; and (2) it was not
a random sample. These issues pose problems in many statis-
tical analyses because traditional frequentist methods are based
upon the assumption that the data are created by a repeat-
able stochastic mechanism. While mainstream statistics treat
the observable data as random and the unknown parameters
of the population are assumed ﬁxed and unchanging, in the
Bayesian view, it is the observed variables that are seen as ﬁxed
whereas the unknown parameters are assumed to vary ran-
domly according to a probability distribution. Therefore, in
Bayesian models, the parameters of the population are no longer
treated as ﬁxed and unchanging as a frequentist approach would
assume4.
In sum, the main advantages of the Bayesian approach are
twofold: (1) it enables highly ﬂexible model speciﬁcations (as the
one needed to account for the hierarchical structure of our data);
and (2) is more appropriate for settings where the data is not a
random sample, but the entire population. In addition, it offers a
clear and intuitive way to present results. For example, it appears
more intuitive by generating probability statements about the ﬁnd-
ings (for more readings on the advantages of Bayesian inference,
check the introductory chapters of Gill, 2002; Gelman et al., 2003;
Jackman, 2009).
To best accommodate the structure of our data, we used a mul-
tilevel or hierarchicalmodel non–nested structure (by competency
and rater group). Equation 1 below represents our model speci-
ﬁcation, which assumes a linear association between GMAT and
ESCI-U scores.
GMATi, c, r ˜ N (μi, σ )
μi = αc, r+ ESCI -U θ c, r+ Femaleβr+
Female∗ESCI -Uδc, r
σ ˜ U (0,100)
αc, r ˜ N (0,1000)
θ c, r ˜ N (r,t ,σθ )
r,t ˜ N (0,1000)
σθ ˜ U (0,10)
βr ˜ N (0, σβ)
σβ ˜ U (0, 100)
δc, r ˜ N (r, t ,σ δ)
r, t ˜ N (0,1000)
σ δ ˜ U (0,10)
4Instead of a frequentist approach, in this approach a parameter is assigned a
prior distribution (based on previous research in the ﬁeld), which is then updated
with the actual data by means of a speciﬁed likelihood function, so as to pro-
duce a posterior distribution of the parameter (Wagner and Gill, 2005). In fact, in
our approach we are not entitled to use a p-value (as in frequentist statistics) as
the probability of obtaining the observed sample results under the null hypoth-
esis. As mentioned the data is not a sample of a larger population but it is a
population.
The i subscript refers to the individual, the c subscript refers
to the competency and the r subscript refers to the rater group
(self, personal or professional). The intercept, αc,r , varies by com-
petency and rater group. The parameters that account for the
ESCI-U effect, θc,r , have a hyper-parameter5, r,t , that varies
by rater group and by type of competency (i.e., cognitive or
emotional).
Additionally, themodel includes gender as a source of variation,
with coefﬁcient βr varying by group of raters. The moderator
effect of gender on the association between ESCI-U and GMAT
is also speciﬁed, an interaction that is parameterized as δc,r –
varying by competency category and rater group, with hyper-prior
speciﬁcation that depends on the type of competency.
In total, there are six main parameters of interest to be esti-
mated, which are compared regarding the type of competency
(cognitive or emotional) and the rater group. Estimating a model
like the one above is not possible using “canned” procedures
from mainstream statistical packages. This confounds the other
seemingly inappropriate assumptions from frequentist approaches
based on maximum likelihood. One technical solution is to use
Bayesian simulation techniques, which allow for highly ﬂexible
model speciﬁcations6.
RESULTS
To test the structure of the 13 competency scales, we used LISREL
8.80 with the covariance matrix to estimate the factorial com-
position. The same CFA model was speciﬁed for professional
and personal raters. The ﬁt indexes of the measurement model
were satisfactory, as shown in Table 1. Factor loadings of the
items per competency were above 0.65. The usual global indexes
shown in Table 1 are below or close the appropriate thresholds
(Hu and Bentler, 1999). The relatively high values of chi-square
were actually due to some irrelevant misspeciﬁcations which were
magniﬁed due to the high power situation (large sample size
and high reliability). We could have released a few constraints
on uncorrelated uniqueness but their estimated values would be
negligible.
In addition, it is well known that these global ﬁt indexes may
have limitations resulting in erroneous conclusions (Saris et al.,
2009). Therefore, we checked whether: (1) all the estimated val-
ues were reasonable and of the expected sign; (2) the correlation
5Hyper-parameters provide a clear illustration of the Bayesian view on pop-
ulation parameters. That is, there are no static assumptions made about the
mean of a parameter, rather the mean is allowed to ﬂuctuate according to its
own probability function. The subscript r on the hyper-parameter refers to
the gender and the subscript t refers to the type of competency, Cognitive or
Emotional.
6As mentioned earlier, Bayesian inference requires researchers to provide prior
distributions for the parameters of the model. Given the lack of previous
research on this topic, however, the current prior distributions were weakly
informative. Consequently, our model has been estimated using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods, more speciﬁcally, the Gibbs sampler. JAGS (Plum-
mer, 2003) has been used for the estimation, while the chains have been
analyzed under R with the coda and ggmcmc libraries (Plummer et al., 2006;
Fernández-i-Marín, 2013; R Development Core Team, 2013). A total of 5,000
samples of two chains of simulated posteriors have been acquired under dif-
ferent initial values, with a burn-in period of 1,000 iterations. There is no
evidence of non-convergence of the series according to the Geweke (1992)
test.
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Table 1 | Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model fit for different sources of raters (n = 641).
Raters CFA model Satorra-Bentler χ2 (df) 90% CI RMSEA P -value for test of close
fit (RMSEA < 0.05)
CFI SRMR
Professional 4751 (2261) (0.0404; 0.0437) 1.000 0.992 0.0525
Personal 5399 (2261) (0.0456; 0.0488) 0.994 0.988 0.0579
residuals suggested the addition of parameters; and (3) the mod-
iﬁcation indexes and expected parameter changes led to plausible
estimates. This process focuses more attention on the detection of
misspeciﬁcation errors rather than solely on the global ﬁt (Saris
et al., 2009). It considers the power of the test in addition to
the signiﬁcance levels. The results did not show any signiﬁcant
misspeciﬁcations in our CFA model for each set of raters.
Results from a discriminant validity analysis show that all the
competencies are adequately discriminated7. Discriminant valid-
ity was assessed by comparing the square root of the AVE, as
shown in Table 2, of each reﬂective construct with the correla-
tions between the constructs, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. Despite
the relatively high magnitude of some correlations among com-
petencies as shown in Tables 3 and 4, the results suggested that
the 13 competencies were adequately discriminated. To be sure,
the two cognitive competencies were integrated into one scale for
this analysis. Any model that speciﬁed a correlation between two
competencies constrained to one has been rejected. Therefore,
these results suggested the appropriateness of maintaining the 13
competencies rated by others as separate scales.
With this evidence supporting validity of the scales, we
addressed reliability. In Table 2 we used Cronbach’s α for assess-
ing the internal consistency of each set of ﬁve items within each
competency. However, for those competencies in which tau-
equivalence (Bollen, 1989) was not fulﬁlled, we used Heise and
Bohrnstedt’s (1970) W, which only requires ﬁtting a unidimen-
sional factor analysis model.
Although the two models shown in Table 2 fulﬁll the conﬁg-
ural invariance (same CFA model for personal and professional
raters), they showed support for rejecting the condition that the
item loadings were the same in both groups of raters (i.e., they had
measurement equivalence). Intraclass correlation indexeswere not
considered because we did not need to aggregate raters into one
category of “others.” As a result, the two raters’ perspectives were
considered under a hierarchical model speciﬁcation.
The outcome of a Bayesian model is not a point estimate of
the coefﬁcient with an associated standard error, but a complete
density distribution of the parameter, which can then be simply
summarized by using its median and standard deviation to resem-
ble the traditional frequentist approach of parameter estimates
and standard errors. Moreover, percentiles of the parameter’s dis-
tribution are used to summarize its credible interval (which is the
7In addition, as indexes of discriminant and convergent validity (Bagozzi and Yi,
1988), we ﬁrst checked the average variance extracted (AVE; i.e., the average com-
munalities per competency). As mentioned, the results showed that all items have
loadings above 0.65, with competencies having always an AVE above or close to
0.5. In addition, cross-loadings from a previous EFA showed that all the items have
much higher loadings with their respective construct (as suggested by Chin, 1998)
than with any other competency.
Bayesian equivalent to a parameter’s conﬁdence interval in classi-
cal statistics). In addition, results and substantial interpretations
of some of the parameters are presented using graphical ﬁgures, in
accordancewith statisticians’advice of “turning tables into graphs”
(Gelman et al., 2002).
COGNITIVE VS. EMOTIONAL COMPETENCIES
As mentioned earlier, the main parameters of interest, r,t , are
those that describe the association between GMAT and ESCI-U
competencies depending on which type of competency, cognitive
or EI, and which of the three groups of raters are considered. A
caterpillar plot is shown in Figure 2 with the median of the pos-
terior distribution of each parameter and the 90 and 95 percent
credible intervals. The parameters can be interpreted as follows:
(a) if the distribution crosses the zero point, there is no consistent
relationship of signiﬁcance; and (b) if the line is to the right or the
left of the zero point, then it tells us about the relative impact. For
example, in Figure 2, the cognitive competencies assessed by pro-
fessional sources have a positive relationship to g. The distribution
can be said to show that an increase of one unit in the cogni-
tive competencies, as scored by professional raters, is expected to
produce an on average increase of around 8.5 units in the GMAT
scores. EI and cognitive competencies show no relationship to g
with observations from personal sources. Observations from pro-
fessional sources show a positive relationship between EI and g.
Observations from self-assessment show a negative relationship
between EI and g. In all three groups of raters the association
between GMAT scores and the raters’ evaluation of the cognitive
competencies is considerably higher than with the raters’ evalua-
tion of EI competencies. This clearly indicates that GMAT scores
are associated in a different way with the ESCI-U scores pro-
duced by the three groups of raters. Adding to the main effects
mentioned, these results show that the rater group has a moder-
ator effect on the association between ESCI-U and GMAT scores.
Therefore we ﬁnd support for hypothesis 1, strong support for
hypothesis 2, and clarity as to the different sources for hypothesis 3.
Figure 2 also shows that others’ ratings of behavior agree more
with each other than they do with self-perceptions. This is a well-
established result (Atwater and Yammarino, 1992; Carless et al.,
1998) that brings further support to our claim that clustering self-
report with others’ ratings or 360◦ based approaches confuses the
relationships of EI to different constructs.
Another way to examine these results is by using probability
statements, which is one of the advantages of using Bayesian infer-
ence. In this sense, the probability that cognitive competencies are
more strongly associated with GMAT scores than the EI compe-
tencies ranges between 81.5 percent for professional raters, 92.7
for personal raters and 97.8 for self-evaluations. Therefore, the
data offers strong evidence for hypotheses 3.
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Table 2 | AVE, Cronbach’s α and Omega of the 13 competencies (a) personal and (b) professional (the two cognitive competencies were
combined into one factor for this analysis; n = 641).
Constructs AVE Cronbach’s α 
Pers Prof
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
[AO] Achievement orientation 0.519 0.587 0.842 0.875 0.860 0.880
[A] Adaptability 0.558 0.591 0.856 0.875 0.890 0.910
[CFM] Conﬂict management 0.497 0.521 0.824 0.854
[CM] Coach and mentor 0.610 0.617 0.882 0.888
[ESA] Emotional self-awareness 0.589 0.591 0.874 0.847
[ESC] Emotional self-control 0.676 0.731 0.905 0.920
[E] Empathy 0.610 0.654 0.885 0.896
[I] Inﬂuence 0.498 0.534 0.828 0.847 0.840 0.870
[IL] Inspirational leadership 0.693 0.702 0.913 0.920
[OA] Organizational awareness 0.555 0.578 0.852 0.869
[PO] Positive outlook 0.652 0.572 0.902 0.868
[T] Teamwork 0.654 0.695 0.902 0.914
[C] Cognitive 0.543 0.561 0.909 0.916 0.920 0.929
Table 3 | Correlation matrix of competencies as scored by personal raters (n = 641).
AO A CFM CM ESA ESC E I IL OA PO T
[A] Adaptability 0.817
[CFM] Conflict management 0.685 0.865
[CM] Coach and mentor 0.626 0.705 0.853
[ESA] Emotional self-awareness 0.560 0.597 0.726 0.749
[ESC] Emotional self-control 0.566 0.720 0.809 0.534 0.460
[E] Empathy 0.588 0.726 0.905 0.814 0.720 0.721
[I] Influence 0.582 0.805 0.802 0.666 0.605 0.500 0.587
[IL] Inspirational leadership 0.724 0.802 0.827 0.786 0.644 0.557 0.596 0.845
[OA] Organizational awareness 0.651 0.870 0.841 0.693 0.568 0.646 0.746 0.783 0.764
[PO] Positive outlook 0.619 0.696 0.670 0.575 0.534 0.553 0.517 0.552 0.734 0.566
[T] Teamwork 0.640 0.780 0.890 0.824 0.594 0.675 0.787 0.653 0.786 0.811 0.674
[C] Cognitive 0.781 0.900 0.793 0.641 0.629 0.632 0.646 0.797 0.769 0.806 0.601 0.646
To provide deeper insight into the consistency of the distri-
butions, Figure 3 shows the caterpillar plot of all the 52 θc,r
parameters, one per each of the 14 ESCI-U competencies, and
the three rater groups. As can be seen, the parameters’ distri-
butions are quite consistent within the EI and cognitive types
of competencies results shown in Figure 2. The ﬁgure can
be read as follows, taking as an example the ﬁrst element of
Figure 3: an increase of 1 unit in the competency score of pattern
recognition by professional raters is expected to generate an on
average increase of about 7.5 in the GMAT score. Yet, regardless
of which rater perceptions are considered, cognitive competen-
cies always show higher association with GMAT scores than EI
competencies.
THE MODERATOR EFFECT OF GENDER
Regarding the moderator effects of gender, females showed sub-
stantially lower associations betweenEI and g thanmales, as shown
in Figure 4. In fact, it is negative for observations from each of the
self and professional observers and non-signiﬁcant for personal
observers for females. Meanwhile, there is a positive relationship
between EI and g for males as viewed from professional observers.
Although varying in intensity, for all sources for both EI and
cognitive competencies, males show a stronger relationship to g
than females. Regarding cognitive competencies, the relationship
to g is stronger for males than females from all sources. This pro-
vides further support for hypotheses 3 and clariﬁes why hypothesis
4 is important.
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Table 4 | Correlation matrix of competencies as scored by professional raters (n = 641).
AO A CFM CM ESA ESC E I IL OA PO T
[A] Adaptability 0.892
[CFM] Conflict management 0.770 0.840
[CM] Coach and mentor 0.740 0.743 0.875
[ESA] Emotional self-awareness 0.674 0.730 0.799 0.777
[ESC] Emotional self-control 0.509 0.627 0.799 0.593 0.527
[E] Empathy 0.637 0.752 0.930 0.854 0.784 0.788
[I] Influence 0.762 0.853 0.888 0.785 0.803 0.603 0.784
[IL] Inspirational leadership 0.757 0.786 0.793 0.833 0.682 0.538 0.689 0.867
[OA] Organizational awareness 0.686 0.854 0.829 0.738 0.729 0.680 0.825 0.858 0.722
[PO] Positive outlook 0.734 0.742 0.759 0.662 0.603 0.600 0.683 0.705 0.781 0.669
[T] Teamwork 0.683 0.753 0.877 0.903 0.683 0.698 0.887 0.757 0.741 0.830 0.692
[C] Cognitive 0.848 0.908 0.832 0.743 0.776 0.589 0.720 0.869 0.769 0.797 0.652 0.696
FIGURE 2 | Caterpillar plot of the posterior distribution of the effects of
types of competencies on GMAT scores, by rater. Credible intervals
(median, 90 -thick line- and 95% -thin line-) of the distribution of the 
parameters that account for the association between the type of
competency and the GMAT score. Hence, for the ﬁrst element
(Emotional-Personal), one unit increase in emotional competencies is
expected to decrease the GMAT by around one point. However, since the
credible interval overlaps zero, there may be weak evidence of an actual
decrease.
DISCUSSION
The study examined the relationship between behavioral EI and
g. We found that cognitive competencies are more strongly
related to g than EI competencies. EI, as seen by others, is
slightly related to g, in particular for observations from pro-
fessional raters for males, but there is no relationship from
observations of personal raters, and a slightly negative rela-
tionship of EI and g from self-assessment. When we examined
gender moderating effects, there appears to be a relationship
between EI and g for males with observations from professional
raters. With females, there is no relationship between EI and
g with observations from personal raters, and a slight nega-
tive relationship with observations from professional raters and
self-assessment.
In alignment with both Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera
(2006) andBoyatzis (2009) frameworks of the research onEI, these
results offer further support to distinguish between approaches to
EI that are based on self-perception and those that are behav-
ioral. This would add to the literature by supplementing the other
approaches and levels of EI with the behavioral approach and
helps us develop a more holistic model of the EI. Even with this
approach, for males with assessment from professional colleagues,
there is a relationship between EI and g. It is not as strong as the
relationship with cognitive competencies and g. But it is there.
These ﬁndings support the idea reported in other studies that to
be effective in management, leadership or professions, we prob-
ably need some distribution of EI, cognitive competencies and g
(Boyatzis, 2006; O’Boyle et al., 2011).
Self-assessment showed a slight negative relationship between
EI and g. This raises the question as to whether self-perception
approaches to EI will be as good in predicting job performance
(Taylor and Hood, 2010). But a recent meta-analysis of self-
assessment methods did show consistent predictive effects of EI
(Joseph et al., 2014). Perhaps for those jobs and professions that
involve more analytic activities and tasks which require a higher
level of g – e.g., a bench scientist, engineering programmer,
creative artist or mathematician, self-perceived EI may be rela-
tively less accurate in performance prediction than a behavioral
approach.
The gender moderating effects noted may be interpreted as a
result of the different expectations and attributions from others
to males and females. Whether emerging from stereotyping or
social comparison processes, they force what appears to be a more
generous attribution of the link between EI and g to males than
females. One dilemma is that some studies may confound such
processes by using a measure of g that appears gender biased. For
example, the Ravens Progressive Matrices, although considered
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FIGURE 3 | Caterpillar plot of the posterior distribution of the effects of each competency on GMAT scores, by rater. Credible intervals (median, 90 –
thick line – and 95% – thin line) of the distribution of the θ parameters that account for the association between each competency and the GMAT scores.
one of the best measures of g, is a visual comparison task (i.e.,
choosing a ﬁgure that ﬁts into a sequence more than others). Since
males appear to handle such spatial reasoning more quickly, as
a result of prior gender based training and socialization, may
give males a different distribution on the results than females.
It is recommended that these “male normative” intelligence tests
(Furnham, 2001), are paired with the Mill Hill Vocabulary or
some such similar test that balances a measure of g with spe-
ciﬁc skills in which females do better than males (Boyatzis et al.,
2012).
Overall, the different results from different raters is a reminder
that the reality of what you see depends on the direction in which
you look, and the color of the lenses you wear.
IMPLICATIONS
The results suggest that research on EI should examine at more
than one level within studies, the ability, trait, self-perception or
behavioral levels. It may help in understanding the relevance of EI
to life and work outcomes, as well as other constructs in psychol-
ogy. They also suggest that research on EI should include measures
Frontiers in Psychology | Educational Psychology February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 72 | 10
Boyatzis et al. Behavioral EI and g
FIGURE 4 | Expected Moderating Effect of Gender on the Relationship
Between ESCI-U score on Cognitive and Emotional Competencies and
GMAT, by type of Rater.The lines represent the expected effect of ESCI-U
scores (as departures from the sample mean in the horizontal axis) and GMAT
scores (as departures from the sample mean in the vertical axis). Flat lines
represent situations in which the association between ESCI-U and GMAT is
not clear. Increasing lines can be read as follows: a unit increase in the
ESCI-U score for a male/female in an Emotional/Cognitive competency as
measured by a speciﬁc rater is expected to increase the GMAT score by a
certain amount given by the vertical axis.
of g to show the unique variance contributed by each concept and
show the relative power of each. When collecting behavioral EI
data, these results suggest that analyses should examine the sources
of the observations as a possible moderator or mediator on the
dependent variables. For example in this research, it is likely that
the professional environment provides more opportunities for the
raters to assess g-related competencies than the personal environ-
ment. It is also crucial to analyze data for gender effects that may
not be apparent in more direct, statistical analysis.
Professionals using 360◦ assessments to coach or develop EI
should be prepared to identify systemic differences across gender
and rater types. Otherwise, individuals may leave their coaching
session thinking they have an actual “problem”with certain raters,
when in reality it is a systematic bias shared across the population.
LIMITATIONS
One of the limitations of this study emerges because the data came
from a single school with diverse nationalities. As such, it threatens
external validity. The study should be replicated in other schools
to insure that a speciﬁc school’s selection and admissions criteria
have not biased results.
By focusing on MBA students, we also threatened construct
validity. Social desirability is one of the most common validity
threats associated with the use of questionnaires in this postgrad-
uate population. Raters provided by the individual rated might
create a halo effect, an overall positive feeling leading to inﬂate
their perception of how often desirable behaviors are present. Spe-
cially, self-assessment is often misguided for this overall positive
feeling about oneself, or because being competent is desirable, thus
increased positive self-assessment tends to occur. Future research
should address this issue as well.
CONCLUSION
Emotional intelligence exists at multiple levels. The behavioral
level of EI shows a different relationship to g than other levels
or approaches to EI. Different people around us, at home and
at work, will see different facets of our behavior, depending on
the kind of relationship and rapport they have established. Some
raters are best equipped to assess certain competencies than oth-
ers because they witness frequently the activities that elicit those
behaviors. While our study reveals that raters from a profes-
sional sphere are more apt to evaluate cognitive competencies,
future research would beneﬁt from looking further into discov-
ering which rater type among professionals (boss, colleagues or
subordinates) is best suited to assess which ESCI-U competency.
The same can be said of the pervasive impact that gender stereo-
types and social comparison processes have on observations of
others and their interpretations of it. Regarding EI, to be of most
help in discovering insights that will be useful to improving our
lives, we should be more comprehensive about the variety in
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approaches to EI and more sensitive to their differences at the
same time.
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